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Abstract 
Devolution in Northern Ireland followed directly from the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement which provided, inter alia, for a democratically elected Assembly 
‘inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, 
and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the 
community’. More than six years on, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly 
are in suspension for the fourth time (the latest since October 2002). The conjunction 
of devolution and the implementation of the Agreement mean that the former is wholly 
dependent on the vagaries of the latter and, as a consequence, has devalued the 
potential of devolution to improve the governance of Northern Ireland. 
 
Introduction 
More than six years after signing the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement
2
 the political 
situation in Northern Ireland is (once again) in limbo. The Northern Ireland Assembly 
has been in suspension since October 2002 and its second set of elections witnessed 
the anti-Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) top the polls. Moreover, 
according to the Independent Monitoring Commission
3
, 'paramilitary activity as a 
whole is at a disturbingly high level, and violence short of murder is at a level which 
would cause outrage in the rest of the United Kingdom or in Ireland' (Independent 
Monitoring Commission, 2004: 8.2).  All of this is at odds with the British 
Government's key objective to keep devolution in place through 'creative ambiguity', 
or letting the peace process breathe, on the issue of decommissioning - the major 
problem which has dogged the political process (Blair, 2003). 
 
This tacit, or on occasions explicit, government tactic of creative ambiguity has 
served to directly link the political process and the peace process, regarding them as 
                                                          
2
 The title of the Agreement is contested in Northern Ireland, with unionists/loyalists preferring the 
designation 'Belfast Agreement' and nationalists/republicans using 'Good Friday Agreement', denoting 
the day on which it was concluded. To avoid partisan labelling, the term used in this article is 'the 
Agreement'. 
3
 The Independent Monitoring Commission was set up by the British and Irish Government on 7
th
 
January 2004. It has three functions: to report on the continuing activities of paramilitary groups; to 
report on security normalisation in Northern Ireland; and, to consider claims by parties in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly that ministers or other parties are not committed to non-violence and exclusively 
peaceful and democratic means or are not conducting themselves in accordance with the pledge of 
office. Article 3 of the International Agreement notes that 'the objective of the Commission is to carry 
out [its functions] with a view to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive 
devolved government in Northern Ireland.' 
 4 
mutually reinforcing, although without a clear notion of whether there is causality 
between the two processes, its direction or robustness. For example, the (then) 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland argued the Agreement established the principle 
that 'political stability is best achieved in the absence of violence, but an unbreakable 
peace can only be built in the context of fair, inclusive and functioning political 
institutions' (Mandelson, 2000a). Hence, long-term political stability and peace is 
predicated upon violence abatement and devolution, respectively. The problem, 
however, is that intermittent and faltering spells of devolution have delivered a hugely 
imperfect peace. In fact, as the Independent Monitoring Commission's (IMC) Report 
(2004) makes clear 'recent years, and particularly since the Agreement, have seen a 
marked increase in total paramilitary violence short of murder by both republican and 
loyalist groups' (IMC Report, 2004, 20: 4.4). Although the British Government has 
linked devolution to the wider peace process, in reality there has been little immediate 
impact. The insidious criminal activities of loyalist and republicans groups involved 
in drugs, extortion, paramilitary-style shootings and beatings is evident with or 
without devolution. They have not abandoned violence - theirs is a mafia culture 
created by decades of paramilitary conflict and buoyed-up by the release of prisoners 
under the Agreement. The link between the political process (with the outworking of 
devolution) and the peace process is therefore problematic. As Bradbury and Mitchell 
(2001: 267) observe 'power sharing may have been the most effective and perhaps the 
only means of creating peace but it makes the process of 'normalising' politics in 
Northern Ireland very difficult'. To use devolution as a mechanism to advance the 
peace process has failed to realise the potential of the former, whilst making little 
headway on the latter. 
 
Has the Blair Government's approach of 'creative ambiguity' finally been frustrated by 
a series of false dawns on the issue of decommissioning which has led to a collapse in 
trust between the political parties? This article aims to do three key things. First, it 
will examine the 4 periods of devolved government in Northern Ireland. In particular 
it will highlight how, through a policy of 'creative ambiguity', the political and peace 
processes (devolution, the implementation of the Agreement, and the transition to a 
peaceful society) have become inextricably linked. Second, using attitudinal survey 
data, it will interrogate the linkages between devolution, the performance of the 
Assembly and Executive and the wider political agenda - because the Agreement has 
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run into trouble, by association so has devolution. Finally, it takes stock of where we 
are now with devolution in the event of a continuing impasse on the political front.  
 
Background  
Devolution in Northern Ireland followed directly from the (1998) Agreement which 
provided, inter alia, for a democratically elected Assembly 'inclusive in its 
membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and, subject to 
safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community' (Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement: 1998: 5). The approval of the people of Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland was sought for the Agreement in referendums held in both 
jurisdictions on 22
nd 
May 1998. The referendum in Northern Ireland resulted in a 
71.1% vote in favour of the Agreement (with a turnout of 81.1%), and 94.4% support 
in the Republic of Ireland (on a 55.6% turnout). These figures belie a split in unionist 
support with two exit polls suggesting a small majority (55% in the RTE/Lansdowne 
exit poll) endorsing the Agreement at the referendum. Such overwhelming support for 
the Agreement and concomitant devolved government heralded a new era of peace 
and political stability. Hence, on 2
nd
 December 1999 the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and its power sharing Executive Committee of Ministers assumed powers of self-
government under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 which gave legal effect to the 
Agreement (O'Leary, 2001). The 108-member Assembly has responsibility for all 
major public services ('transferred' matters) in Northern Ireland although 'excepted' 
(e.g. defence, taxation and foreign policy) and 'reserved' matters (e.g. policing, 
security policy, criminal justice) remain under the control of the Secretary of State. 
Excepted matters are the responsibility of Westminster but reserved matters can be 
transferred to the Assembly at some future point. The Secretary of State has already 
referred a number of reserved matters to ad hoc committees of the Assembly for 
consultation (e.g. Proceeds of Crime Bill, Criminal Justice Reform, and Criminal 
Injuries Compensation). Commenting on the importance of the Agreement, Bogdanor 
noted: 
 The Agreement has a double significance for the government of the United 
Kingdom since it proposes not only a solution to the Irish problem, but also 
recognition of the process of devolution to the non-English parts of the United 
Kingdom (Bogdanor, 2001: 109) 
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The argument in this paper is that a necessary concentration on the former has 
detracted from the effective outworking of devolution and, as a consequence, 
devalued the potential for improving governance within Northern Ireland. 
 
Such initial hope and optimism exemplified in the referendums have now faded. 
Almost 5 years on, devolution is in suspension for the fourth time, over 40% of 
Protestants feel the Agreement is 'basically wrong' and should be 'renegotiated or 
abandoned' (Dowds, 2004) and there is little immediate prospect of reverting from 
direct rule to devolved government
4
. Yet despite considerable progress claimed by 
both the British and Irish Government in implementing many aspects of the 
Agreement, it has been impossible to find a compromise between republicans and 
unionists on the arms issue which remained (until the Leeds Castle talks, September 
2004) a stumbling block to the restoration of devolution. The Joint Declaration by the 
British and Irish Governments (April 2003:8) set out proposals necessary ‘to promote 
trust, implement the Agreement fully, restore the devolved institutions and attain a 
fully normal society’. The proposals aimed to secure broad support among the parties 
and prompted the question (from the Prime Minister) – will the IRA halt all 
paramilitary activities? The IRA’s response was ambiguous and, as a consequence, 
the opportunity for a pro-Agreement combined political front was missed. This 
resulted in a more general loss of trust between parties and a long-term stalemate with 
intermittent flurries of political activities precipitated or forestalled by elections (to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly - November 2003, and European elections - June 
2004), a review of the operation of the Agreement, new proposals from the 
Democratic Unionist Party to restore devolution (Devolution Now and North 
South/East West), and the controversial report of the Independent Monitoring 
Commission. That this would all ends in tears was captured by the comments: 'the 
outworking of this sustained constitutional conflict was not difficult to anticipate. Not 
only would Northern Ireland be cut-off from the modernisation dynamic of the wider 
UK constitutional reform project, devolution would be involution. Worse still, the 
questions on which politics would focus would be eminently predictable' 
(disband/reform/retain the RUC, flags, prisoner release, and marching) (Wilford and 
                                                          
4
 The Life and Times Survey 2003 showed that 77% of Catholics felt the Agreement was 'basically 
right' and should be 'implemented in full or the specifics need to be renegotiated'. On the other hand, 
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Wilson, 2000: 81). Devolution in Northern Ireland, unlike Scotland and Wales, has 
become inextricably linked to the divisive issues which precipitated its inception and 
were to characterise its operation in practice, to which we now turn. 
 
Devolution - period 15 
The political parties involved in the multi-party negotiations leading to the Agreement 
described it as offering 'a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning' (Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement 1998: 1). The (then) Secretary of State remarked, 'after a 
quarter of a century the curtain is finally coming down on direct rule…after 30 years 
of violence the people of Northern Ireland can at last look forward to a future of hope 
and confidence' (Mandelson, 1999a). Yet even at the outset, devolution in Northern 
Ireland was born out of the 'high' politics of resolving the constitutional and security 
issues of Northern Ireland and not a public policy agenda linked to local 
accountability, subsidiarity and, as a consequence, better public services. Typically, 
this included amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution triggered by 
devolution, and parallel British constitutional changes including the repeal of the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920. These signalled the last traces of irredentism by the 
Republic of Ireland and enshrined the principle of consent in law as the cornerstone of 
a new dispensation. The changes were to assuage unionist fears of annexation by the 
Irish State. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom for as long as that is the 
wish of a majority of its people. If the people of Northern Ireland were formally to 
consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, the government of the day would 
bring forward proposals, in consultation with the Irish Government, to give effect to 
that wish. These constitutional matters contrast sharply however with the public's 
perception of devolution (expressed in survey evidence) and the role which a local 
Assembly would play
6
. The results suggested: 
 Many respondents anticipated that the Assembly would be a serious working 
chamber, rather than a venture for the continuation of the nationalist-unionist 
struggle. They also suggest a certain fatigue with the already protracted peace 
process and a desire to move on to more prosaic but immediately relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                      
41% of Protestants considered the Agreement was 'basically wrong' and needed to be 'renegotiated or 
abandoned'.   
5
 The first period of devolution was: 2
nd
 December 1999 - 11
th
 February 2000. 
6
 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey - data gathered October 1999 - January 2000. This is a 
random sample of 2,200 adults across Northern Ireland conducted by ARK - Queen's University 
Belfast and University of Ulster. 
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issues of governance and the delivery of services by locally controlled 
institutions (Wilford et al, 2003: 43) 
 
Welcoming devolution, the Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble, described 
direct rule as the 'debasement of democracy' (Northern Ireland having had its own 
parliament for over 50 years). His party's agreement to share power with Sinn Féin 
was conditional upon their commitment to exclusively peaceful means and an 
acknowledgement that decommissioning was essential to the peace process. The IRA, 
in turn, appointed an interlocutor to work with the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), a body charged with monitoring, 
reviewing and verifying progress on decommissioning illegal arms. There had been 
no decommissioning of IRA weaponry in advance of devolution and Sinn Féin argued 
that it must take place in the context of the full implementation of the overall 
settlement
7. Unionists, however, were nervous that Sinn Féin in government might 
want to back its political demands with the tacit threat of a return to violence. By way 
of reassurance, the Secretary of State made it clear at the start to the House of 
Commons that: 
 
If there is default, either in implementing decommissioning, or indeed for that 
matter devolution, it is understood that the two governments, British and Irish, 
will take the steps necessary to cease immediately the operation of the 
institutions - the Executive, the Assembly…Nobody should doubt my resolve 
to ensure that no party profits from preventing progress in all aspects of the 
Good Friday Agreement…In terms of the steps taken and those in prospect, a 
heavy political price will be paid by those who default…It would pain me to 
do so, but I would not shrink from suspending the institutions if it proved 
necessary, thus restoring the status quo, so as to consider how to rectify the 
default (Mandelson, 1999b: 345). 
 
These were prophetic words and clearly linked devolved government to the wider 
political agenda of Northern Ireland in the mind of the Secretary of State, with the 
British and Irish governments being guardians of the devolved institutions.  
 
By February 2000 devolution was in trouble as David Trimble had nothing to show 
for his policy of 'jumping first' into government with Sinn Féin in the expectation that 
                                                          
7
 The three principles agreed by the pro-Agreement parties as a pre-requisite to devolution were: an 
inclusive Executive exercising devolved powers; the decommissioning of paramilitary arms by May 
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the IRA would reciprocate with decommissioning. The Ulster Unionist leader had 
gambled, with a post-dated letter to the Ulster Unionist Council, if decommissioning 
had not begun by their meeting in February (2000) he would resign. This was offered 
in a bid to invoke the party's insistence on their mantra of  'no guns, no government'. 
To further cement the link between devolution and the wider political agenda, the 
Secretary of State announced to the House of Commons - 'if there is no 
decommissioning, there will be no implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, 
there will be no devolution in Northern Ireland. It is a matter of colossal regret, but it 
is a fact' (Mandelson, 2000b). In short, the devolution agenda became mired in the 
search for a constitutional settlement and its effective implementation. 
 
In advance of suspension the (then) First Minister expressed disappointment and 
argued that direct rule is the 'third best' option. 'Treating Northern Ireland properly is 
the second best, but I think the best of all is in fact to see devolution succeed within 
the United Kingdom which is what we're trying to do through the implementation of 
the Belfast Agreement' (Trimble, 2000a). With paramilitaries refusing to break the 
logjam on decommissioning, the Secretary of State argued that although progress had 
been made between the IRA and the IICD, it was insufficient and he suspended the 
Assembly on 11
th
 February 2000. Commitments to decommission, he demanded, had 
to be clear otherwise they could not command confidence in their intent.  
 
Nationalists reacted angrily and complained that suspension represented accedence to 
the Unionist veto and was aimed expressly at stopping the resignation of the First 
Minister, a move that would have collapsed the institutions in any event. Republicans 
blamed the suspension on a mixture of unionist obduracy and British Government 
treachery in the face of the IICD assessment that an IRA commitment on the arms 
issue 'holds out the prospect of an agreement which will enable it (the Commission) to 
fulfil the substance of its mandate' (Nieminen, de Chastelain and Sens, 2000)
8
. The 
IRA responded by withdrawing its interlocutor from future contact with the IICD. 
Sinn Féin claimed that Britain's unilateral suspension of the Assembly was in direct 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2000; and the modalities of decommissioning to be determined by the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning.  
8
 The IICD's assessment was published 1½ hours after the Secretary of State had taken the decision to 
suspend the institutions. The Secretary of State later argued that with more time to clarify what the IRA 
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violation of the Agreement. A rift between Dublin and London was evident with 
suggestions the Irish Government shared Sinn Féin’s view that the suspension was 
illegal under the terms of the Agreement. Public recriminations between the 
governments were muffled in the interests of the wider process. The British 
Government defended its position by arguing that the two questions (posed by the 
(then) Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon) - 'were the IRA prepared to disarm, and 
if so, when would they do so', went largely unanswered and hence unionists had lost 
confidence that arms would be put permanently beyond use. The choice for the 
Secretary of State (with the apt sobriquet 'the Prince of Darkness'), who excoriated 
Sinn Féin's 'lordly and arrogant' rejection of pleas to disarm, was between suspension 
and collapse.  
 
The first period of devolved government therefore reinforced the link between 
devolution (its survival) and decommissioning. Unionists wanted certainty about 
decommissioning before they participated in the institutions. Republicans countered 
that certainty about decommissioning could only be achieved when the political 
institutions had been functioning for some time. In this political limbo neither 'guns or 
government' were delivered - the first period of devolution had foundered on the 
IRA's failure to decommission. Nationalists argued that decommissioning became a 
problem because the unionists made it so (above all other issues) and a more 
productive focus was to ensure that violence had ended and the use of violence for 
political purposes would not be resumed (Mallon, 2000). Decommissioning, in other 
words, should never have been elevated to the importance it has achieved, not least 
because much of the ongoing violence (deaths, shootings and assaults) originates from 
loyalist paramilitaries. Decommissioning, it appears, matters more for its symbolism 
than its practical impact. But symbols matter in Northern Ireland. The Government, in 
turn, placed more emphasis on keeping devolution going than extracting arms from 
the IRA and tacitly acquiesced in the (Sinn Féin) view that the silence of guns would 
suffice - 'creative ambiguity' in action. For republicans, the ‘pike in the thatch’ 
mentality (dating back to the 1798 rebellion against the British when pikes were put in 
the thatched roofs of peasant soldiers ‘just in case’) is still part of their consciousness 
militating against decommissioning. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intended, and to build on it, it might have been possible to give unionists the confidence to continue 
with the Executive. 
 11 
Devolution  - period 29  
The stalemate on decommissioning continued until May 2000 at which point, 
according to the terms of the Agreement, it should have been completed
10
.  The mood 
changed with an IRA statement that they 'would initiate a process (within a defined 
context of British Government commitments) that would put their weapons 
completely and verifiably beyond use'. On the back on this, David Trimble achieved a 
narrow victory
11
 at the Ulster Unionist Council meeting for his proposal to rejoin the 
Northern Ireland Executive, and the Secretary of State signed the Devolution Order 
effective from midnight 29 May 2000. The UUP leader described his policy choices 
as follows: 
On the one hand, we can draw nationalism and republicanism into a 
consensus. On the other, we can be governed by London with Dublin 
interference, deprived of a voice, deprived of a vote and deprived of a veto. I 
will not go down that path… Getting the IRA to abandon their habits was 
never going to be easy… The party has taken huge risks for peace. It did so for 
a united Northern Ireland, within a pluralist United Kingdom. A much better 
option than any united Ireland (Trimble, 2000b: 6). 
 
His critics, both within and outside the party, described the IRA statement as a 
garbled pronouncement which did not emphatically commit the IRA to disarm. 
Although an IRA arms inspection by independents
12
 in June 2000 heralded some 
movement by republicans, the IRA failed to decommission. Republicans claimed that 
London had not met their commitments on policing reforms and demilitarisation. 
Arms inspection was seen as a poor substitute for unionists' long-standing demand 
that the IRA should actually start to give up weapons. David Trimble backed away 
from the inspection regime, under pressure from his party, and used the launch of the 
2001 Westminster elections to announce that he would resign as First Minister by 1
st
 
July if there was no progress from the IRA on decommissioning. Bew explains his 
reasoning thus: 
 
                                                          
9
 The second period of devolution was: 30
th
 May 2000 - 10
th
 August 2001. 
10
  The Agreement reaffirmed all participants commitment to total disarmament of all paramilitary 
organisations 'within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the 
Agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement' - The Agreement, 1998: 
20 - 3) - authors' emphasis. 
11
 The Ulster Unionist Council voted to support the proposal by the party leader, David Trimble, to 
rejoin the Northern Ireland Executive by 459 votes to 403 or 53% for and 47% against. 
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Mr Trimble is certain that the Agreement will suffer from an incurable moral 
deficit if republicans evade the obligation, which they themselves formally 
acknowledge, to decommission. Most important of all for the process of 
reconciliation, prevarication on this issue - unfortunately acceded to from time 
to time by the two governments - has underlined the feeling that republicans 
are engaged in an act of pure self-interested cynicism. Mr Trimble has been 
prepared to be flexible about timing…but he is absolutely inflexible about the 
principle (Bew, 2001:16). 
 
The First Minister resigned on 1st July 2001 but nominated his fellow UUP Minister 
(Reg Empey) as caretaker, triggering a six-week period in which to resolve the 
impasse over arms
13
. Trimble's resignation as First Minister was an attempt to assuage 
hardliners in his own party and wrongfoot the anti-Agreement DUP. His case for 
suspending the Assembly was that the IRA had failed 'to give up, break up or cement 
up a single illegal weapon' and he had been duped by Sinn Féin (The Economist, 
2001:16). The British and Irish Government produced a package of proposals on 
policing reform, demilitarisation and the stability of the institutions, aimed at breaking 
the deadlock. In response, the IRA presented the IICD with proposals to 'initiate a 
process' that would put arms completely and verifiably beyond use (Nieminen, de 
Chastelain and Sens, 2001). Unionists saw this as a statement on the modalities of 
decommissioning which failed to address when it would happen. To avoid plunging 
Northern Ireland into an election, the Secretary of State (John Reid) decided to 
suspend devolved government from 11
th
 August for one day to allow parties further 
time to consider the proposals of the two governments. This bought an additional six-
week period for a deal to be brokered. Republicans accused the British Government of 
acceding (once again) to the unionist veto and the IRA responded by withdrawing 
their offer to the IICD.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 Cyril Ramaphosa, a leading figure in the African National Congress, and Martti Ahtisaari, a former 
President of Finland, reported on 26
th
 June 2000 to the British and Irish Government that the arms 
dumps they had seen contained 'a substantial amount of military materials safely stored'.  
13
 The Northern Ireland Act 1998 specifies that if the First or Deputy First Minister resigns or ceases to 
hold office, there must be a new election for both within six weeks. If no election is possible, ultimately 
there must be an Assembly election. 
 13 
Devolution - periods 3 &414 
Little improved in the intervening period. A second 24-hour (described as 'technical') 
suspension was announced by the Secretary of State on 21
st
 September after failing to 
break the deadlock and reinstate the First Minister, permitting a further six-week 
breathing period.  Dr. Reid argued that he could not credibly repeat suspension in this 
way (did not intend to do so) and there was now an opportunity for those with 
illegally held arms to resolve this issue. Ulster Unionists exerted further pressure by 
withdrawing their ministers from the power-sharing Executive. Within days the IICD 
witnessed a 'significant' quantity of IRA weaponry (arms, ammunition and explosives) 
put completely beyond use, described by Secretary of State Reid as taking the 'peace 
process on to a new political level - rarely has the whole community be so united' 
(Reid, 2001a). The IRA claimed 'this unprecedented move is to save the peace process 
and to persuade others of our genuine intentions'. Undoubtedly, however, United 
States pressure to decommission and the events of September 11
th
 were influential on 
republican thinking. Global attitudes to international terrorism intensified that 
pressure and the IRA leadership did not want to be caught on the wrong side of 
history. Despite much over-use of the words 'historic breakthrough', this move was 
considered just that because the IRA had previously looked upon disarmament as 
surrender. As one observer argued: 
For too long politics in Northern Ireland have been imprisoned by dreary 
recrimination and perpetual crises - much of it revolving around the arms 
issue. It created a wearying atmosphere of political and public despondency 
(Moriarty, 2001:6). 
 
The return to political stability wobbled when the UUP leader, David Trimble, 
renominated his ministers to the Northern Ireland Executive but failed to get elected 
First Minister after two rebel members from his own party voted against him. 
Through procedural redesignation of smaller parties he was re-elected (the Alliance 
Party (3 members) and Women’s Coalition (1 member) redesignated as ‘unionists’), 
prompting a period of political calm. The IRA had finally moved on decommissioning 
and devolution was again fully functioning at Stormont. The Ulster Unionist leader, 
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 The third and fourth periods of devolution were: 
12
th
 August 2001 - 21
st
 September 2001 
23
rd
 September 2001 - 14
th
 October 2002. 
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however, came under increasing pressure over time as unionist support for the 
Agreement ebbed and disillusionment with the peace process grew.  
 
This 'final' period of devolution lasted almost 13 months until it was indefinitely 
suspended by the Secretary of State in October 2002 for the fourth time since its 
inception in December 1999. The most recent crisis was the result of (another) 
political impasse described at the time as 'a lack of trust and loss of confidence on 
both sides of the community' (Reid, 2002). This stemmed from concerns about parties' 
commitment to exclusively democratic and non-violent means and accusations by 
each community of the other that they did not endorse the full operation and 
implementation of the Agreement. A climate of mistrust and uncertainty prevailed 
accentuated by events such as the trial of republicans in Colombia (allegedly involved 
in training the left-wing FARC guerrilla group, but since found not guilty), the break-
in at Special Branch offices in Castlereagh Police Station (where personal details of 
Special Branch detectives were removed), and political espionage at Stormont 
implicating Sinn Féin. In the latter, unionists accused the IRA of exploiting Sinn 
Féin's membership of the Executive to gather information (names and addresses of 
prison officers) for use in future acts of violence. Sinn Féin, in turn, complained about 
a police ‘raid’ on their offices at Parliament Buildings in Stormont. A subsequent 
investigation by the Police Ombudsman found no evidence to substantiate allegations 
that the searches were ‘politically motivated’ but the scale and manner of the police 
operation was totally disproportionate (Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 
2004). 
 
The power-sharing arrangements in the Assembly intended to build trust between 
parties appeared to have achieved the opposite. Reflecting on the extent to which 
devolved institutions throughout the United Kingdom had been consolidated as foci of 
governance, Bradbury and McGarvey (2003: 219) commented that in Northern 
Ireland 'the power-sharing basis of devolution… could involve development towards 
either's (nationalist/unionist) contrary aspirations. At the same time, expectations of 
reconciliation were so low that consolidation for those simply committed to 
devolution as a way of sustaining the peace process often focused merely on keeping 
the show on the road'. Devolution in Northern Ireland therefore, in contrast to other 
devolved regions, was seen as synonymous with the peace process rather than a focus 
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of governance. Therein lies the problem - the public's expectations that devolution 
could deliver a public policy agenda of better, more accountable public services and, 
at the same time, 'solve' the seemingly intractable political and security problems of 
Northern Ireland were unrealistic (and unrealised). Public attitude data gathered in 
1999/2000 (n= 1,800) show that 48% of those surveyed considered it more important 
for the Northern Ireland Assembly to spend time on day-to-day issues (improving the 
health service, economy and employment). Some 40% felt it should concentrate on 
both political  (decommissioning, continuing violence) and day-to-day issues 
(Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys 1999, 2000). As Shirlow (2001: 744) 
observed 'within the Northern Irish context it is evident that devolution cannot, in the 
short term, resolve, political antagonisms which are rooted in the perpetuation of 
partition, armed paramilitary groups and territorialization of cultural and economic 
claims'.  
 
The Secretary of State vowed to re-establish devolved institutions as quickly as 
possible, hastened by a review of the Agreement, but argued devolved government 
could only flourish on the basis of trust between the parties. The intention was to 
bring to an 'unambiguous and definitive conclusion' the transition from violence to 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means which had dogged devolution (Joint 
Declaration, 2003:7). In short, the test is whether or not the IRA completes 
decommissioning and begins to disband. At the time of the fourth suspension, 
Secretary of State Reid claimed the real losers in the whole process were 'the ordinary 
people of Northern Ireland, those who appreciate and deserve local decisions which 
affect local people being made by local politicians, not least because the devolved 
administration has achieved so much on their behalf, and in their interest' (Reid, 
2002).  Whether this glowing assessment of the impact of devolution is deserved or 
was simply intended to put pressure on politicians for its return is in question. As 
Wilford and Wilson argued: 
 The lack of a concerted 'loyal' opposition within the Assembly and the 
existence of fissiparous forces within the Executive trammelled the operation 
of the institutions - as did, of course, the persistence of the more intractable 
issues, chiefly decommissioning. Over the period, the institutions managed to 
function, albeit increasingly imperfectly. It would be miserly to suggest that 
the greatest achievement of devolution until the time of writing was its 
survival: though the accomplishments were modest, they were real (Wilson 
and Wilford, 2001: 95). 
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Post Suspension 
The period since the fourth suspension was intended to restore confidence between 
the political parties, hold elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and reinstate 
power-sharing as soon as possible. The British and Irish Governments through a Joint 
Declaration (April 2003) committed, inter alia, to the protection of Northern Ireland 
institutions against arbitrary interruption and interference, a timetable for security 
normalisation, early ideas on the devolution of policing and justice, and further 
commitments on human rights and equality. The governments, in turn, demanded an 
‘immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary activity’ (Joint 
Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, 2003:13). The Prime Minister 
called for radical 'acts of completion' by the IRA to rescue the political process, 
reassure unionists and provide the basis for restored devolution. He posed 3 questions: 
does the IRA intend to - end all activities including targeting; to put all its arms 
beyond use; and does the IRA's position mean a final closure of the conflict? Clearly 
the time for 'creative ambiguity' had passed and clarity became the order of the day. 
The response, according to the Secretary of State, was not a clear and unambiguous 
statement (Murphy: 2003). Sinn Féin, in turn, called for 'completion' by the British 
Government on establishing an accountable policing service, demilitarisation, and 
progressing the human rights and equality legislation. A third act of IRA 
decommissioning (October 2003) aimed at kick-starting the political process 
foundered when the UUP leader pulled out of a (now hackneyed) 'historic' deal with 
Sinn Féin at the last minute which failed to meet unionist demands for a clear and 
transparent report - full disclosure on arms. The IICD could not commit to these 
transparency demands at the IRA's insistence of confidentiality. Unionists needed 
very public reassurances that major acts of decommissioning had taken place to 
significantly impact on public opinion. Recriminations and counter accusations of bad 
faith followed.  
 
Wilson argued that the republican movement has repeatedly evaded responsibility for 
delivering decommissioning in three ways: denying any links between Sinn Féin and 
the IRA; claiming that decommissioning could only be voluntary, and therefore 
dependent on others demonstrating to republicans that 'politics works'; and asserting 
(in the contradiction to the text) that the Agreement renders decommissioning a 
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'collective responsibility', rather than for the paramilitary-linked parties to address 
(Wilson, 2001: 2.3). Republicans, on the other hand, have faced internal arguments 
and indecision over the arms issue - hanging on to them is their means of bargaining, 
putting them 'beyond use' is an irretrievable step. Obfuscation by the British 
Government on arms merely compounds their own indecision. Typically, Secretary of 
State Reid argued that 'decommissioning remains an indispensable part of the 
Agreement' but at the same time pointed out that 'it is a voluntary act' (Reid, 2001b & 
2001c). 
 
The political parties went into the Assembly elections in November 2003 (postponed 
twice in the hope of political movement) against the background of a deadlocked 
process where there was the prospect of no Executive after an election - an Assembly 
but no government, described as an election to a ghost Assembly. The election results 
saw Sinn Féin eclipse the SDLP to become the largest nationalist party in the 
Assembly. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) topped the polls and displaced the 
UUP
15
. The displacement of mainstream political parties (SDLP and UUP) has, 
ironically, been a feature of the devolved era (Hayes and McAlister, 1999; Mitchell, 
2001). Sinn Féin and the DUP further consolidated their electoral positions in the 
more recent European elections (June 2004)
16
. The prospects of a power-sharing 
Executive with a DUP and Sinn Féin First and Deputy First Minister respectively 
seem remote. On the unionist side the outcome highlighted the fact that the clear 
majority of Protestants is disillusioned with the Agreement
17
 and, ipso facto, prefer 
direct rule over devolution. As an advisor to Mr. Trimble put it, albeit privately and 
somewhat rhetorically 'what's the difference between direct rule and devolution? 
Direct rule is popular!' (Wilford and Wilson, 2003: 43) - particularly among unionists. 
Equally, republicans claim to be committed to the political process. As one observer 
put it, 'why should the fastest-growing party (Sinn Féin) in Ireland resort to violence - 
                                                          
15
 In the November 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections the DUP won 30 seats; UUP 27 seats; 
Sinn Féin 24 seats; SDLP 18 seats; Alliance 6 seats Independent 1 seat; PUP 1 seat; and UKUP 1 seat. 
16
 The DUP topped the poll in the June 2004 European elections with an increased share of the vote 
(+3.6%) since 1999. Sinn Féin took the previously held SDLP seat in Europe with a large increase in 
its vote (+8.98%) and the Ulster Unionist candidate was elected at the 3
rd
 stage with the held of a large 
number of transfers from the DUP. 
17
 A survey carried out by Millward Brown Ulster for the Belfast Telegraph in November 2003 found 
that 61% of Protestants felt the Agreement should be renegotiated by political parties compared to 29% 
of Catholics expressing the same view. 
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who needs armalites when the ballot box has delivered so spectacularly'? (McKittrick, 
2003a: 12).  
 
With the DUP now the largest political party, further enhanced by 3 defections from 
the UUP,
18
 devolution is under serious threat as Ian Paisley opposes the presence of 
Sinn Féin in a power sharing Executive and refuses to negotiate with them directly. 
The DUP has challenged why Northern Ireland should be denied the benefits of 
devolved government because the IRA disqualifies Sinn Féin by failing to maintain a 
complete and unequivocal ceasefire. In short, they question why the IRA should have 
a veto over all political development in Northern Ireland. The DUP produced 
proposals (Devolution Now) for the restoration of devolution (before the IRA disarms) 
where power would be vested in the 108-member Assembly which would run 
government departments by agreement through votes with a weighted majority of 
unionists and nationalists. This power could be transferred to a voluntary coalition of 
ministers if the SDLP agreed to go into government with unionists, but without Sinn 
Féin. A mandatory coalition government, including Sinn Féin, would be formed only 
if the IRA engaged in acts of completion, including disarmament. Nationalists, 
republicans and the UUP were under-whelmed by the proposals and rejected them as 
the basis for any potential settlement. 
 
The Prime Minister has argued that paramilitarism is the only remaining obstacle to 
the reinstatement of the institutions of the Agreement. He drew on the first report of 
the Independent Monitoring Commission which concluded that in order to promote 
the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive devolved government in 
Northern Ireland: 
Paramilitary groups must decommission all illegally held weapons; they must 
cease all forms of criminal activity; and all political parties with people elected 
to public positions, or aspiring to election, must play a full and constructive 
part in the operation of all criminal justice institutions (Independent 
Monitoring Commission, 2004: 8.7). 
 
In the absence of political progress, the fear is of a slow but inexorable unravelling of 
the peace process and an upsurge in accompanying low level communal violence. 
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From the start the Agreement was viewed differently by the two communities. 
Nationalists and republicans saw it as progress and an opportunity - described as 
'asymmetry in attitudes' - Catholics more positive and Protestants more ambivalent 
(Wilford et al, 2003: 46). For some unionists it represented concessions (power-
sharing) as well as the prospect of peace. Over time, unionist support for the 
Agreement has ebbed away, accelerated by the IRA's intransigence on 
decommissioning, whereas nationalists still support its full implementation. A key 
aim of the Agreement was to encourage republicans (and loyalists) into the 
democratic process and wean them away from violence. The only sanction available 
to the British Government when they default however is to collapse the institutions 
upon which the Agreement is premised, hence 'expelling' them from the democratic 
process. This is self-defeating. Observers however caution against viewing devolution 
as a short-term fix - 'in Northern Ireland, more than any other part if the United 
Kingdom, devolution remains a process' (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2002: 311). The 
prospect of reviving devolution in the short term, however, looks unlikely at the time 
of writing. Moreover, public attitudes to devolution have become entangled with their 
opinions on the wider political process. For example, some 83% of respondents in an 
attitudinal survey in 2003 (n = 1,800) agreed/strongly agreed that any Northern 
Ireland Government should have to ensure that Protestants and Catholics share power. 
Similarly, 77% of respondents did not want parties, linked to paramilitary groups still 
involved in violence, as part of any future Northern Ireland Executive (Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2003). As Wilford and Wilson (2003: 116) argue 'it is 
not the idea of devolution per se that was the casualty of the shift in popular opinion. 
Rather, lack of trust in the republican movement subverted Protestant support'. But 
they go on to highlight the lack of public affinity with devolution: 
 
 Part of the difficulty was the only limited evidence, as in Scotland and Wales, 
that the citizens of Northern Ireland had developed an instrumental 
commitment to devolution. Particularly among Protestants, there was merely 
lukewarm affirmation of the devolved ministers' mantra-like claim to 'making 
a difference'. Indeed, substantively, the record from December 1999 - however 
rationalised by suspensions - was limited (Wilford and Wilson, 2003:84) 
 
It is to the performance and effectiveness of devolution that we now turn. 
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 Jeffrey Donaldson, Arlene Foster and Norah Beare defected to the DUP in January 2004 giving the 
DUP 33 seats in the Assembly leaving the Ulster Unionists with 24 seats, equal to Sinn Féin. 
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The effectiveness of devolution? 
Because devolution has been a product of the Agreement, its outworkings, in 
particular the performance of the Northern Ireland Assembly, has become inextricably 
linked to the 'high' politics of Northern Ireland. Hence, it is difficult to judge the 
effectiveness of the Assembly and devolution in isolation from the wider political 
agenda. An empirical analysis provides evidence that people's attitudes to the 
devolution are bound up with wider perceptions of the success of the Agreement and 
the peace process. The data used are from the Northern Ireland Life and Times 2003 
probability survey involving 1,800 face-to-face interviews with adults (18 years+) 
conducted during the period October 2003 to February 2004
19
. 
 
At a descriptive level the data show a mixed picture on how people viewed the 
performance of the last Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive (December 1999 - 
October 2002 with intermittent suspensions). Survey respondents were questioned 
about how good a job they felt the Assembly and Executive had done in the day-to-
day business of running Northern Ireland - the results are shown in table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
How good a job do you think the Assembly and Executive did in the ordinary day-
to-day running of Northern Ireland?
20
 
 
 Frequency
21
 Percent 
A good job 430 26.0 
Neither a good job nor a bad job 874 52.8 
A bad job 351 21.2 
Total 1655 100.0 
 
Crudely, around one quarter of respondents considered it had performed either a good 
or bad job and the remainder were ambivalent. This, however, belies significant 
differences in the opinions of Catholics and Protestants on the performance of the 
Assembly and Executive (see table 2 and figure 1). Catholics are significantly more 
likely to consider the Assembly and Executive did 'a good job' in the day-to-day 
running of Northern Ireland than Protestants who were more ambivalent about its 
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 The authors wish to acknowledge ARK - the Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive 
(University of Ulster and Queen's University, Belfast) for the production of the primary data and access 
to it for the purposes of analyses. 
20
 Question 12, Section 4: 'Political Attitudes' in Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2003.  
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performance or considered they did 'a bad job'. That said, almost half the Catholic 
respondents were neutral (neither a good or bad job) in their attitude to the 
Assembly’s performance. 
TABLE 2 
 
Day-to-day running of Northern Ireland Assembly by Religion 
 
 Religion 
Performance of Assembly Catholic (%) Protestant (%) No religion (%) 
A good job 38.9 16.8 31.7 
Neither a good or bad job 48.4 56.7 45.0 
A bad job 12.7 26.5 23.3 
 100% 100% 100% 
Total N = 1,637 604 913 120 
 
Pearson Chi-Square: 2 = 109.19  
Significance: p < .001 
Cramer's V = 0.18 
 
To put this in the context of devolution in the United Kingdom however, these 
findings are in line with public attitudes towards the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish 
Parliament. For example, only one quarter of Scots felt the Scottish Parliament had 
made 'a real positive difference to life in Scotland and been a success so far'. In 
Wales, when asked about changes since 1997 in areas such as education, the national 
health service and general standard of living, only a minority (between 24 - 31%) 
thought things had improved (ESRC Devolution and Constitution Change 
Programme: 2004). Hence, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly have so far 
made only a limited impact, despite evidence of support for devolution in both 
regions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21
 Data presented here excludes 'don't know' category. 
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Figure 1: Day to day running of the Assembly/Executive
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Survey respondents in Northern Ireland were asked to express their future preference 
for devolution - its retention or a return to direct rule from Westminster (see table 3). 
Whilst just under 40% of respondents would be sorry to see the abolition of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the return to direct rule, most people were ambivalent. 
 
Table 3 
 
If, in the future, the Northern Ireland Assembly were to be abolished and Northern 
Ireland were to be governed as it was before devolution, would you be…22 
 
 Frequency
23
 Percent 
Pleased 127 7.5 
Sorry 652 38.7 
Don't mind much either way 908 53.8 
Total 1687 100.0 
 
Again this disguises significant differences between Catholic and Protestant 
respondents (see table 4 and figure 2). Catholics are significantly more likely to 'be 
sorry' if  'in the future the Northern Ireland Assembly were to be abolished and 
Northern Ireland were to be governed as it was before devolution'. Conversely, 
Protestants are significantly more likely to 'be pleased' or 'not to mind either way' 
about the reinstatement of direct rule.  
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 Question 14, Section 4: 'Political Attitudes' in Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2003. 
23
 Data presented here excludes 'don't know' category. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Abolition of Northern Ireland Assembly by Religion 
 
 Religion 
Abolition of Assembly Catholic (%) Protestant (%) No religion (%) 
Pleased 1.7 11.4 7.0 
Sorry 55.0 27.9 40.3 
Don't mind much either way 43.3 60.7 52.7 
 100% 100% 100% 
Total N = 1,667 606 932 129 
 
Pearson Chi-Square: 2 = 136.44  
Significance: p < .001 
Cramer's V = 0.20 
 
These views, however, can be contrasted with opinions expressed on the future 
constitutional options for Northern Ireland. When asked to state a preference from a 
range which included independence, devolution, direct rule from Westminster or a 
united Ireland, respondents opted for Northern Ireland remaining part of the United 
Kingdom with its own elected parliament which had law-making and taxation powers 
(a Scottish type parliament), followed by its own elected Assembly (the existing 
Stormont model) with limited law-making powers (29.3% and 22.3% respectively)
24
. 
In the wider UK context of devolution there is stronger support for devolution as a 
constitutional preference over other forms of governance. The majority of Scots 
(52%) support the Scottish Parliament and there is a growing preference amongst the 
Welsh for a more powerful Scottish-style parliament over the current National 
Assembly in Wales, (37.8% and 27.1% respectively). This illustrates the asymmetry 
of devolution or what Jeffery has described as 'a collection of separate initiatives 
which lacks an overarching sense of purpose' (ESRC Devolution and Constitution 
Change Programme: 2004). 
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Figure 2 
Abolition of the Assembly
don't mind muchsorrypleased
C
o
u
n
t
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Religion 
Catholic
Protestant
No religion
 
 
Moving beyond the level of description, our a priori assertion is that people's 
assessment of the success or effectiveness of devolution in Northern Ireland is 
associated with the wider political agenda rather than the performance of the 
Assembly and Executive per se. To test this, a five-variable frequency analysis was 
performed to develop a hierarchical log-linear model of factors associated with the 
performance of the Assembly and Executive in the day-to-day running of Northern 
Ireland. Hence, we tested the associations between people's attitudes on the following 
five variables:  
- assessment of the performance of the Assembly and Executive in the ordinary 
day-to-day running of Northern Ireland (variable name: ASSEM
25
); 
- who benefited most from the Agreement - unionists, nationalists or both equally 
(variable name: GFAGREE
26
); 
- whether there is trust in the Assembly to work in Northern Ireland's best interests 
(variable name: TRUST
27
); 
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 Survey question: How good a job do you think the Assembly and Executive did in the ordinary day-
to-day running of Northern Ireland?  
A good job; neither a good nor a bad job; or, a bad job (recoded for analysis). 
26
 Survey question: Thinking back to the Good Friday Agreement now, would you say that it has 
benefited unionists more than nationalists, nationalists more than unionists, or that unionists and 
nationalists have benefited equally?  
Unionists benefited a little/a lot more than nationalists. Nationalists benefited a little/a lot more than 
unionists. Unionists and nationalists benefited equally (recoded for analysis). 
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- if progress has been made in the search for peace in Northern Ireland (variable 
name: PEACE
28
); and 
- the stated religion of the respondent (variable name: RELIG29). 
 
Some 1,360 respondents provided usable data for this analysis. The analysis began 
with all three-way interactions and associations between the five variables above and 
then eliminated those which could be excluded, whilst retaining a reasonable fit 
between expected cell frequencies generated by the model and the obtained 
frequencies. The final model included four three-way interactions and one two-way 
association as follows:  
 
ASSEM*GFAGREE*RELIG 
ASSEM*GFAGREE*PEACE  
GFAGREE*TRUST*RELIG 
TRUST*PEACE*RELIG 
ASSEM*TRUST 
 
This model had a likelihood ratio 2 (136) = 116.7, p = .88, indicating a good degree 
of fit between observed frequencies and expected frequencies generated by the model. 
Considering the specific interactions and association in the final model in the order 
above: 
1. Assessment of the performance of the Assembly and Executive in the running of 
Northern Ireland and those seen to have benefited more from the Agreement are 
significantly associated and this pattern of association is different depending on 
the religion of the respondent.  The data show that those who felt nationalists 
benefited more from the Agreement were significantly more likely to see the 
Assembly and Executive as having done 'a bad job' in the day-to-day running of 
Northern Ireland. In addition, Catholics who felt that nationalists had benefited 
more than unionists as a result of the Agreement were significantly more likely to 
think that the Assembly did 'a good job' than Protestants in the same category. 
Conversely, Protestants who felt nationalists had benefited more from the 
Agreement were significantly more likely to think the Assembly 'did a bad job'.  
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 Survey question: How much do you trust a Northern Ireland Assembly to work in Northern Ireland's 
best interests? 
Just about always; most of the time; only some of the time; almost never (recoded for analysis). 
28
 Survey question: Thinking about the last few years and the search for peace in Northern Ireland. 
How do you personally feel about what has happened in the last few years?  
I feel happy that we have made progress - yes or no?  
29
 Survey question: religion of the respondent: Catholic, Protestant, or no religion. 
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2. Assessment of the performance of the Assembly and Executive in the running of 
Northern Ireland and those seen to have benefited more from the Agreement are 
significantly associated and this pattern of association is different depending on 
perceived progress in the peace process. The data show, for example, that those 
who felt that nationalists had benefited more from the Agreement and who were 
'unhappy about progress towards peace' were significantly more likely to feel the 
Assembly and Executive 'did a bad job' in the day-to-day running of Northern 
Ireland. 
3. Who benefited more from the Agreement and trust in the Assembly to work in 
Northern Ireland's best interests are significantly (positively) associated and this 
pattern of association is different depending on the religion of the respondent.  
4. There is a significant positive association between attitudes to trusting the 
Assembly to work in the best interests of Northern Ireland and whether progress 
has been made in the search for peace, mediated by the religion of the respondent. 
5. Unsurprisingly, there is a significant association between those who trusted the 
Assembly to work in the best interests of Northern Ireland and whether they felt it 
had performed well on the day-to-day running of the Province. Those who 'just 
about always' or 'most of the time' trusted the Assembly to work in the best 
interests of Northern Ireland were significantly more likely to see it as doing 'a 
good job'. 
 
What these results show therefore is that people's assessment of devolution, expressed 
in their views on the performance of the Assembly and Executive in running Northern 
Ireland, is inextricably bound to their support for the Agreement, attitudes to the 
peace process, and the extent to which they trust the institutions to work in the best 
interests of the Province. These attitudes, in turn, are mediated by community 
background. Catholics offer a more positive assessment of the performance of the 
Executive and Assembly than Protestants and would be significantly more unhappy 
with the abolition of devolved institutions and the return of direct rule in the future.      
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Conclusions 
Commenting on the implementation of devolution in the United Kingdom, one 
observer concluded 'devolution has bedded in remarkably smoothly' (Jeffery, 2004). 
Whether this applies to Northern Ireland is in question. There is a qualitative 
difference in the devolution experience in Northern Ireland where its focus was (and 
continues to be) securing accommodation between unionism and nationalism rather 
than a new form of governance with local decision-making, accountability and 
responsiveness to regional needs. Despite the ongoing political problems, Bew (2002: 
1087) argues that 'the principle of devolution is not in crisis, the problems are more of 
an inter-communal, political nature and these are very serious'. Hence, devolution in 
Northern Ireland has languished by its association with the Agreement which was 
aimed at resolving long-standing constitutional, security and human rights/equality 
issues. Each crisis in the implementation of the Agreement became a crisis for 
devolution. This despite the fact, as Lord Holme (2002: 1209) pointed out, 'devolution 
is one plank in a rather complicated edifice represented by the Agreement'.  
 
That the Agreement and devolution have become synonymous means that the fate of 
the former will dictate the destiny of the latter. Moreover, this blurring of boundaries 
between trying to achieve a political settlement and, at the same time, introduce 
constitutional change under devolution has served to merge these issues in the minds 
of the public. Hence, from the empirical evidence presented here, devolution is less 
about the role played by the Assembly and Executive in the day-to-day business of 
running Northern Ireland and more to do with issues of 'high' politics. The stance of 
the main political parties has compounded the merger and devolution is no longer 
seen as a circumscribed policy of constitutional change. For example, the DUP is 
avowedly anti-Agreement, as are sections of the UUP. Nationalists and republicans, 
on the other hand, are enthusiastically pro-Agreement. The Assembly, an artefact of 
devolution, is however supported by all the political parties (including the DUP) for 
both political and personal interests. As McKittrick (2003b: 20) puts it 'one of the 
major faultlines is whether parties and individuals are for or against the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement, yet membership of the Assembly transcends that fissure'. 
Republicans, in particular, despite reservations about joining a power-sharing 
Executive government in a Province whose legitimacy they do not recognise are keen 
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to restore devolved government. Yet the evidence (table 4 and figure 2 above) 
amongst Protestants is indifference to, or support for, the abolition of the Assembly 
and the restoration of direct rule from Westminster (60.7% and 11.4% respectively). 
This compares starkly with Catholics, the majority of whom (55%) would be sorry to 
see the Assembly go. The level of ambivalence towards the Assembly is more a 
response to its on/off functioning than a commentary on the principle of devolution 
which has become mired in constitutional politics. If this continues devolution, by 
association, will be seriously weakened. Since the reimposition of direct rule in 
October 2002 the public has seen little difference in their daily lives - the status quo 
ex ante. Public services are delivered much as before through civil service 
departments and agencies well-practised operating with a democratic deficit, an 
imperfect peace exists, and resentment grows at the costs of an Assembly which 
cannot function.  
 
Direct rule ministers do not see their roles as a holding operation and have embarked 
on a series of radical reforms (some started by the Assembly). A new domestic rating 
system will take effect in 2007 and the Water Service ‘Next Steps’ Agency is to 
become a government owned company from April 2006. The reforms have been 
criticised by local political parties as a stealth tax and a stop-gap measure towards 
privatising water, respectively. Controversial unilateral proposals (announced by Sinn 
Féin Minister Martin McGuinness as a final act of the devolved administration in 
October 2002) to abolish the education selection system (the so-called ‘11-plus’) have 
been embraced by London ministers. There is increasing criticism that locally elected 
MLAs are playing no part in these day-to-day reforms while at the same time locked 
in political negotiations/impasse. In short, public policy issues are going by default 
and the public’s perception of devolution is jaundiced as a consequence.  
 
The British Prime Minister and Irish Taoiseach set a new deadline (September 2004) 
for intensive talks (Leeds Castle) aimed at restoring devolution. Prime Minister Blair 
voiced a discernible note of frustration - 'we have come a long way in this process but 
there cannot be endless more negotiations, so we are going to have to decide whether 
we can reach agreement and find a way through or not' (Northern Ireland Office: 
2004). The Taoiseach echoed these frustrations 'we can't keep having discussions that 
don't lead to any ultimate conclusions'.  In the event, the Leeds Castle talks remain 
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‘unfinalised’ with agreement reached, according to the two governments, on resolving 
the issues of ending paramilitary activity and putting weapons beyond use. 
Discussions continue however on changing the Agreement at the DUP’s insistence so 
that the Executive has more cabinet responsibility and the power of individual 
ministers is restricted. Nationalists and republicans see the changes as an attempt to 
seize control by unionism in a return to majority rule. The British and Irish 
Governments’ stance is that if agreement cannot be reached ‘we will find a different 
way to move this process forward’ (Northern Ireland Office Joint Statement, 18th 
September 2004). 
 
In the absence of progress, a review of public administration continues, initiated in 
June 2002, 'to review the existing arrangements for accountability, administration and 
delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options for 
reform…within an appropriate framework of political and financial accountability' 
could provide an alternative (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002). Therein the Northern 
Ireland Office Minister (Ian Pearson) sees the role of local government enhanced and 
a significant reduction in the number of public bodies. All of this is with a view to 
improving the quality of public services and enhancing collaboration between 
providers. If the wider political issues continue to prove intractable, a form of 
administrative devolution with councils, many of whom exercise power-sharing 
arrangements, as the principal stakeholders could become attractive. This might offer 
devolution without the associated constitutional baggage. Minister Pearson has 
already announced his preference for 5-8 councils or ‘strong local government’. If the 
proposed councils were to assume the status of unitary councils in the rest of the 
United Kingdom, this could call into question the raison d’être of the 10/11 
government departments reorganised to accommodate devolved power sharing 
arrangements and themselves excluded from the review of public administration. The 
model envisaged by the review team is one in which the Northern Ireland Executive 
and Assembly have a policy development and oversight role, with sub-regional 
councils and other public bodies responsible largely for service delivery. With key 
powers vested in the hands of a much reduced number of (salaried) local councillors 
(a form of administrative devolution) the remit of direct rule ministers would reduce 
significantly. Executive devolution to the Northern Ireland Assembly would follow 
only after a successful conclusion to current negotiations. Whilst radical and probably 
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a second best option ('rolling devolution' for slow learners), it could circumvent the 
conjunction of devolution and the implementation of the Agreement where the former 
is wholly dependent on the vagaries of the latter. Although quite what one would do 
with 108 MLAs is yet another matter. A shift in focus from top-down executive 
devolution to bottom-up administrative devolution may well require less creative 
ambiguity on the part of the British Government and, importantly, more directly 
impact on public opinion should improvements in public services follow. 
 
 
 31 
References 
 
Bew, P. (2001) 'Shrewd Trimble has dodged a stitch-up'. Irish Times, 6
th
 June: 16. 
 
Bew, P. (2002) House of Lords, Constitution Committee - Minutes of Evidence, 10
th
 
June. 
 
Blair, T. (2003) 'Prime Minister confirms postponement of Assembly elections'. 
Belfast:  Northern Ireland Office Press Release - 1
st
 May. 
 
Bogdanor, V. (2001) Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bradbury, J. and Mitchell, J. (2001) 'Devolution: New Politics for Old?' 
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 54 (2): 257-275. 
 
Bradbury, J. and Mitchell, J. (2002) 'Devolution and Territorial Politics; Stability, 
Uncertainty and Crisis', Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 55 (2): 299-316. 
 
Bradbury, J. and McGarvey, N. (2003) 'Devolution: Problems, Politics and Prospects', 
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 56 (2): 219-236. 
 
Dowds, L.(2004) 'Public Attitudes and Identity' in Nations and Regions: The 
Dynamics of Devolution: Report 19, 24-26. ESRC and Leverhulme Trust. UCL: 
Constitution Unit. 
 
Economic and Social Research Council (2004) 'Devolution: what difference has it 
made?' Interim Findings from the ESRC Research Programme on Devolution and 
Constitutional Change. 
 
Hayes, B. and McAllister, I. (1999) 'Ethnonationalism, public opinion and the Good 
Friday Agreement', 30-48, in J. Ruane and J. Todd (eds.) After the Good Friday 
Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland. Dublin: University 
College Dublin Press. 
 
Holme Lord of Cheltenham (2002) House of Lords, Constitution Committee - 
Minutes of Evidence, 10
th
 June. 
 
Independent Monitoring Commission (2004) First Report of the Independent 
Monitoring Commission HC 516. London: Stationery Office. 
 
Jeffery, C. (2004) 'Devolution and Constitutional Change - Commentary' in Economic 
and Social Research Council (2004) 'Devolution: what difference has it made?' 
Interim Findings from the ESRC Research Programme on Devolution and 
Constitutional Change. 
 
Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments (2003). Belfast: Northern 
Ireland Office, April. 
 
 32 
Mallon, S. (2000) 'Mallon still in search of key to decommissioning deadlock', Irish 
Times, 13
th
 April: 14. 
 
Mandelson, P. (1999a) House of Commons Hansard Debates on Northern Ireland, 
30
th
 November Columns: 253-274. 
 
Mandelson, P. (1999b) House of Commons Hansard Debates Political Progress in 
Northern Ireland, 22 November Columns: 345-347. 
 
Mandelson, P. (2000a) 'Round Table - Secretary of State's Comments', Northern 
Ireland Office: Information Service 8
th
 March. 
 
Mandelson, P. (2000b) House of Commons Hansard Debates on Northern Ireland 3
rd
 
February Columns: 1312-1328. 
 
McKittrick, D. (2003a) 'Northern Ireland Elections: Careful planning behind changes 
to political landscape' The Independent 29
th
 November: 12. 
 
McKittrick, D. (2003b) 'One reason to expect fresh agreement - Ulster politicians all 
love the Assembly' The Independent 6
th
 March: 20. 
 
Mitchell, P. (2001) 'Transcending an Ethnic Party System? The Impact of 
Consociational Governance on Electoral Dynamics and the Party System' in R. 
Wilford (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Moriarty, G. (2001) 'The day of liberation for Northern Ireland' Irish Times 24
th
 
October: 6. 
 
Murphy, P. (2003) House of Commons Hansard Debates on Northern Ireland 6
th
 May 
Columns: 642-664. 
 
Nieminen, T., de Chastelain, J. and Sens, A. (2000) Report of the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning, 11
th
 February. 
 
Nieminen, T., de Chastelain, J. and Sens, A. (2001) Report of the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning, 6
th
 August. 
 
Northern Ireland Executive (2002) The Review of Public Administration. Belfast 
Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 
 
Northern Ireland Office Press Release (2004) 'September talks to restore devolution - 
Blair' 25
th
 June. Belfast: Northern Ireland Office. 
 
O'Leary, B. (2001) 'The Character of the 1998 Agreement: results and prospects' in R. 
Wilford (ed.) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (2004) Stormont Search: Police Ombudsman 
Statement, 1
st
 August. Belfast: PONI. 
 
 33 
Reid, J. (2001a) Statement by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the House of 
Commons 24
th
 October Hansard Columns: 302-320. 
 
Reid, J. (2001b) 'Secretary of State responds to IRA announcement' 14
th
 August Press 
Statement. Belfast: Northern Ireland Office. 
 
Reid, J. (2001c) 'Reid tells paramilitaries to put words into action' 24
th
 September 
Press Statement. Belfast: Northern Ireland Office. 
 
Reid, J. (2002) Statement by Secretary of State to the House of Commons 15
th
 
October Hansard Columns: 192-207. 
 
Shirlow, P. (2001) 'Devolution in Northern Ireland/Ulster/the North/Six Counties: 
Delete as Appropriate' Regional Studies, Vol. 35 (8) :743-752. 
 
The Agreement (1998) Agreement reached in multi-party negotiations. Belfast: 
Northern Ireland Office. 
 
The Economist (2001) 'Suspend the Assembly', Vol. 360: 16-17, 7
th
 July. 
 
Trimble, D. (2000a) House of Commons Hansard Debates 'Northern Ireland Bill 
(Programme)'  8
th
 February Columns: 122-178. 
 
Trimble, D. (2000b) 'Party that has taken huge risks for peace is determined to make 
government work'  Irish Times, 9
th
 October: 6. 
 
Wilford, R., MacGinty, R., Dowds, L. and Robinson, G. (2003) 'Northern Ireland's 
Devolved Institutions: A Triumph of Hope over Experience?' Regional and Federal 
Studies, Vol. 13 (1): 31-54.  
 
Wilford, R. and Wilson, R. (2000) 'A 'Bare Knuckle Ride': Northern Ireland' in R. 
Hazell (ed.) The State of the Nations: The First Year of Devolution in the United 
Kingdom. Exeter: Imprint Academic Press. 
 
Wilford, R. and Wilson, R (2003) 'Public Policies' in Nations and Regions: The 
Dynamics of Devolution: Report 16. ESRC and Leverhulme Trust. UCL: Constitution 
Unit. 
 
Wilson, R. and Wilford, R. (2003) 'Northern Ireland: Valedictory?' in R. Hazell (ed.) 
The State of the Nations 2003: The Third Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom. 
Exeter: Imprint Academic Press. 
 
Wilson, R. and Wilford, R. (2001) 'Northern Ireland: Endgame' in A. Trench (ed.) The 
State of the Nations 2001: The Second Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom. 
Exter: Imprint Academic Press. 
 
Wilson, R. (2001) 'Political Context' in Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of 
Devolution: Report 8. ESRC and Leverhulme Trust. UCL: Constitution Unit. 
 
